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Abstract—This paper considers the problem of optimal esti-
mation for linear system with the measurement vector subject
to arbitrary corruption by an adversarial agent. This problem
is relevant to cyber-physical systems where, due to the tight
coupling of physics, communication and computation, a malicious
agent is able to exploit multiple inherent vulnerabilities in order
to inject stealthy signals into the measurement process. These
malicious signals are calculated to serve the attack objectives of
causing false situation awareness and/or triggering a sequence
of cascading effects leading to an ultimate system failure. We
assume that the attacker can only compromise a portion, but
not all, of the measurement channels simultaneously. However,
once a channel is compromised, the attacker is free to modify
the corresponding measurement arbitrarily.
Consequently, the problem is formulated as a compressive
sensing problem with additional prior-information model. The
prior-information considered is a set inclusion constraint on the
measurement vector. It is shown that if the prior set satisfies
certain conditions, the resulting recovery error bound is much
stronger. The approach is applied to the problem of resilient
sate estimation of a power system. For this application, Gaussian
Process is used to build a prior generative probabilistic regression
model from historical data. The resulting Gaussian Process
Regression model recursively maps energy market information to
iid Gaussian distributions on the relevant system measurements.
An optimization-based resilient state estimator is then developed
using a re-weighted `1-minimization scheme. The developed
algorithm is evaluated through a numerical simulation example
of the IEEE 14-bus system mapped to the New York Independent
System Operator (NYISO) grid data.
Index Terms—Resilient estimation, Compressive Sensing, Aux-
iliary models.
I. NOTATION
The following notions and conventions are employed
throughout the paper: N denotes the set of natural numbers.
R,Rm,Rm×n denote the space of real numbers, real vectors
of length m and real matrices of m rows and n columns
respectively. R+ denotes positive real numbers. X> denotes
the transpose of the quantity X . Normal-face lower-case letters
(x ∈ R) are used to represent real scalars, bold-face lower-case
letter (x ∈ Rm) represents vectors, normal-face upper case
(X ∈ Rm×n) represents matrices, while calligraphic upper
case letters (e.g T ) represent sets. Let T ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} then,
for a matrix X ∈ Rm×n, XT ∈ R|T |×n and XT ∈ Rm×|T |
are the sub-matrices obtained by extracting the rows, and
columns respectively, of X corresponding to the indices in T .
N (X), R(X) and σ(X) denote the null space, range space
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and the largest singular value of the matrix X respectively.
For a vector x, xi denotes its ith element. The support of a
vector x ∈ Rm is denoted by supp(x) , {i : xi 6= 0}, with
|supp(x)| ≤ m being the number of nonzero elements of x.
Smk , {x ∈ Rm \ {0} : |supp(x)| ≤ k} denotes the set of
all nonzero k-sparse vectors. The superscript m is dropped
whenever the dimension is clear from context. The p-norm of
a vector x ∈ Rm is defined as ‖x‖p ,
(
m∑
i=1
|xi|p
) 1
p
. Given a
vector x ∈ Rm, the following inequality about vector norms
‖x‖q ≤ ‖x‖p ≤ m(
1
p− 1q ) ‖x‖q , 0 < p ≤ q ≤ ∞
is useful for some results down the line. Given a positive scalar
δ ∈ R+, a saturation function satδ : R 7→ [−δ, δ] is given by
satδ(x) =
 −δ if x < −δx if |x| ≤ δ
δ if x > δ
A best kth term approximation of a vector e ∈ Rm is denoted
by e[k] , min
‖f‖0=k
‖e− f‖1 .
II. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) refer to a generation of
systems with tightly-integrated communication, computational
and physical capabilities that can interact with humans through
many new modalities [1], [2]. Such systems are fundamental
to the operation of various safety-critical applications (e.g
smart grid, connected & autonomous vehicles (CAV), etc).
Their failure can cause irreversible damage to the underlying
physical system as well as to the humans who operate it or
depend on it. For example, critical infrastructure domains are
composed of a multitude of CPS of various scales and at all
levels. The control of CPS is enabled by the proliferation of
sensing devices which allow geographically isolated physical
plants to be remotely monitored. Field embedded devices,
typically called remote terminal units (RTUs), deployed in
large-scale, geographically-sparse CPS collect measurements
related to the physical process. The measured data are sent via
supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to
central master stations. At the central site, the information
from RTUs is utilized to carry out necessary analysis and
control, e.g., determine if a leak has occurred and the level
of criticality. A critical function at the management system
level is to estimate the state variables of the CPS. These
state estimates are then used to adjust the control of the
physical space. In power systems, for instance, once the
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2operating state is known, estimates are utilized for energy
management system application functions such as optimal
flow control, automatic generation control, and contingency
analysis. The results of such functions are used in order to
take preventive and corrective actions as well as ensure secure
and reliable operation of the CPS. Due to the significance of
state estimation routines, it is of paramount importance that
such algorithms incorporate proper mechanisms for operating
resiliently in the event of malicious events [3].
Sophisticated attackers who are able to gain unauthorized
access to the communication network of a CPS can modify the
transmitted measurements to the central control and estimation
stations [4], thereby causing a false situation awareness or
triggering a cascade of events ultimately leading to a system
failure. Furthermore, adversaries can hack into the RTUs or
even infiltrate secondary channels of the supply chain in order
to distort the measurements [5]. Existing work on the topic has
shown that this class of false data injection attacks (FDIAs)
can bypass bad data detection (BDD) schemes and inject
errors in the resulting state estimation without being detected
[4], [6]–[8]. Such detection methods are residual schemes
traditionally based on the largest normalized residual between
the obtained measurements and the predicted values from the
system estimated states [9]. The impact of FDIAs, on power
systems for instance, could skew the electricity markets in
favor of the attacker or even result in masking the outage of
lines and removing the attacked RTUs from the network [10],
[11]. Existing work on addressing the vulnerability of FDIAs
typically rely on protecting a set of devices (and thus a set of
measurements) or verifying each state variable independently.
The high computational and deployment cost, as well as the as-
sociated risks of these methods, have hampered their feasibility
for use in practical real-time systems [6]. Moreover, estimation
techniques developed for specific system configurations [12]
often exhibit poor resiliency performance, in general, against
FDIAs. Therefore, more computationally feasible, adaptive,
and real-time implementable resiliency strategies are needed.
The design of such estimators need to consider adverse settings
in order to reliably estimate CPS state variables.
Consequently, the attack-resilient state estimation has at-
tracted significant attention in recent literature [13]. While
there are numerous work on resilient state estimation, we
focus on the ones that are optimization-based – since our
work ultimately depends on solving a convex program. One
of the earliest work employing optimization [14] formulated
the resilient estimation problem for an LTI system as a
compressive sensing (CS) problem and used standard results
[15] from the CS community to create a convex relaxation of
the resulting optimization problem. Following that, a number
of papers have either modified or extended the framework
to include measurement noise [16], [17], time varying attack
support [18], robustness considerations [19] and distributed
case [20]. There are also numerous applications including but
not limited to; power systems [7], UAVS [18], [21], energy
delivery systems [22], autonomous vehicles and networked
systems.
In this paper, we build on our previous works on enhancing
the recoverability of resilient estimators by incorporating prior
information, either in form of attack-support estimation [23]
or through a more general set inclusion constraint [24]. Here,
we provide theoretical guarantees of how certain bounded-
ness property of the prior information set can improve the
reconstruction error bound of the resulting resilient estimator.
Unlike the previous work [14], [18], [25] which depend on
the Restricted Isometry Property (RIP) [15], we have derived
our results using a related Nullspae Property (NSP) [26]. The
reason for this is given in subsequent sections. Moreover, a
numerical example is given in which the developed estimator is
applied to the NYISO transmission grid. The prior information
generates a likelihood-level ellipsoid constraints on the “true”
measurement vector via a Gaussian Process Regression (GPR)
mean and covariance functions of the locational marginal bus
prices. This example demonstrates tremendous improvement in
resiliency by using readily available auxiliary measurements
to corroborate the state estimation process using the proposed
scheme.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in
Section III we provide necessary definitions and background
for this work. Section IV presents the formulation of the
estimation problem as well as our proposed solution algorithm
for the enhanced state estimator. Experimental details and
simulation results are described in Section V. Our concluding
remarks are discussed in Section VI.
III. BACKGROUND
Consider a linear measurement model of the form:
y = Hx+ e, (1)
where H ∈ Rm×n is a measurement/coding matrix (m > n)
and y ∈ Rm is a measurement vector corrupted by an arbitrary
unknown but sparse error vector e ∈ Rm. By sparsity, we
mean that ‖e‖0 ≤ q, for a given q ≤ m. In classical error
correction problem [27], [28], the objective is to recover the
input vector x ∈ Rn, given the corrupt measurement y and
the matrix H ∈ Rm×n. Consequently an optimal decoder D0 :
Rm 7→ Rn is considered, of the form:
D0(y) = arg min
x∈Rn
‖y −Hx‖0. (2)
Evidently, the existence of such decoder is equivalent to the
uniqueness of the underlying index minimization problem.
Suppose, the coding matrix H is full rank. Let
H = QR =
[
Q1 Q2
] [ R1
0
]
, (3)
be the QR decomposition of H , where Q ∈ Rm×m is
orthogonal, Q1 ∈ Rm×n, Q2 ∈ Rm×(m−n), and R1 ∈ Rn×n
is a full rank upper triangular matrix. Multiplying the left and
right hand sides of (1) by Q>2 , the transformed measurement
model becomes:
Q>2 y = Q
>
2 e. (4)
Thus, the optimal decoder D0 : Rm 7→ Rn is given by
D0(y) = R−11 Q>1
(
y − arg min
Q>2 (y−e)=0
‖e‖0
)
, (5)
3which is equivalently related with the compressive sensing
problem [15]:
Minimize:
e
‖e‖0 Subject to: Q>2 (y − e) = 0. (6)
Subsequently, we will consider the compressive sensing prob-
lem of the form in (6) for analysis purposes, and restrict
ourselves to the decoder of the form in (2)( or (5)) for
algorithm development.
The obvious question that arises, then is to determine if
there is a unique minimizer of the above index-minimizing op-
timization problem. The following proposition, adapted from
[29], gives the condition for the existence of a unique solution
to the optimization problem in (6).
Proposition 1 (Uniqueness). Given k ∈ N, if every 2k
columns of Q>2 are linearly independent and there exists at
least one p ≤ k for which Sp ∩
(N (Q>2 ) + y) 6= ∅, then the
optimization problem in (6) has a unique solution.
Proof. It suffices to show that, for all p ≤ k, the feasible
region Rp ,
{
e ∈ Rm| ‖e‖0 = p,Q>2 (e− y) = 0
}
= Sp ∩(N (Q>2 ) + y) is a singleton. If this is true, then the result
follows from the existence of at least one feasible point for
some p ≤ k. To see that Rp is a singleton, let e1, e2 ∈ Rp,
e1 6= e2, then Q>2 (e1 − e2) = 0. Since every 2s columns
of Q>2 are linearly independent, then the last equation is true
iff ‖e1 − e2‖0 > 2s ⇒ ‖e1‖0 + ‖e2‖0 > 2k ⇒ p > k, a
contradiction. Thus, e1 = e2, implying that |Rp| = 1 ∀ p ≤
k
Corollary 1. If there exists p ≤ m such that S2p ∩N (Q>2 ) =
∅ and Sp∩
(N (Q>2 ) + y) 6= ∅, then the optimization problem
in (6) has a unique solution.
Proof. The statement “every 2s columns of Q>2 are linearly
independent” implies that S2p∩N (Q>2 ) = ∅ for p ≤ k. Thus
the result follows from (1).
The optimization problem in (6), in most instances, does not
lend itself to a solution in polynomial time due to the noncon-
vexity associated with the index-minimization objective. As a
result, it is often replaced with its convex neighbor:
Minimize:
e
‖e‖1 Subject to: Q>2 (y − e) = 0. (7)
As a result, naturally, questions arise about how well the this
convex relaxation recovers the solution to the original problem,
assuming a unique solution exists? For instance, under what
condition(s) will the solution of (7) recover the solution of
the original problem (6). This property called recoverability
has been studied extensively in compressive sensing literature,
largely under the umbrella of either the so called Restricted
Isometry Property (RIP) or the Null Space Property (NSP).
While other notions have emerged in recent years, the RIP and
NSP are the two most common conditions that one imposes
on Q>2 in order to guarantee recoverability. In what follows,
we outline some RIP and NSP-based results that are relevant
to this work.
A. RIP-based results
The RIP was introduced in [15] to establish stable recover-
ability for the relaxed problem in (7). Ever since, there have
been so many other follow-up results and refinements to the
original guarantees published by Candes et. al. In what follow,
we provide a tiny portion of existing results, slightly modified
or built upon in some cases, that are relevant to this work.
Definition 1 (RIP [15]). A matrix A has the RIP of sparsity
k if there exists 0 < δ < 1 such that
(1− δ) ‖x‖22 ≤ ‖Ax‖22 ≤ (1 + δ) ‖x‖22 (8)
for all x ∈ Sk. Moreover, the smallest δ for which the above
inequality holds is called the restricted isometry constant, and
denoted as δk(A).
The above definition essentially requires that every set of
columns with cardinality less that or equal to k behaves like an
orthonormal system. The following theorem lists the recovery
error due to relaxed convex program above.
Theorem 1 ( [15], [30]). Let e be a sparse vector satisfying
Q>2 (y − e) = 0 and eˆ be the solution of (7). If δ2k(Q>2 ) <
1√
2
, then
‖eˆ− e‖2 ≤
2√
k
δ2k +
√
δ2k
(
1√
2
− δ2k
)
√
2
(
1√
2
− δ2k
) + 1
 ‖e− e[k]‖1 ,
(9)
where e[k] is the best k-term approximation of e.
Remark 1. If e ∈ Sk, then eˆ = e. Thus, if δ2k(Q>2 ) <
1√
2
the relaxed program in (7) will recover any k-sparse vector
e ∈ Sk exactly!
Remark 2. While the RIP provides very nice theoretical guar-
antees, computing/numerically verifying the restricted isome-
try constant is NP-hard. However, for a large class of matrices,
the RIP condition holds with overwhelming probability [31].
For any invertible matrix U , the matrix UA share the
same nullspace as A but can have dramatically different
RIP constants. This, at a first glance, might seem like a
major drawback of RIP-based analyses, because the equiva-
lent programs
{
Minimize:
x
‖x‖1 Subject to: Ax = b
}
and{
Minimize:
x
‖x‖1 Subject to: UAx = Ub
}
may end up
having totally different RIP-based recoverability properties.
To overcome this situation, many researchers have derived
their results using subspace-based analysis, which generally
mods out such transformations and provide a more uniform
result. Next, we examine the nullspace property, which has
been widely used for such purpose.
B. NSP-based results
The term nullspace property originates from [26]. It gives
necessary and sufficient conditions for recoverability. Like RIP,
4numerical verification of the NSP is combinatorial and NP-
hard.
Definition 2 (NSPq , [32]). A matrix A is said to satisfy the
nullspace property with parameters γ ∈ R+ and k ∈ N,
denoted by A ∈ NSPq(k, γ), if every nonzero e ∈ N (A)
satisfies
‖eT ‖q < γ ‖eT c‖q
for all T ⊂ { 1 . . . n } with |T | ≤ k.
The following results list some recoverability results based
on the NSP.
Theorem 2 ( [33], [34]). The convex program in (7) uniquely
recovers all k-sparse vector e ∈ Sk if and only if Q>2 ∈
NSP1(k, 1)
Theorem 3. Let e ∈ Rm be a vector satisfying Q>2 (y − e) =
0 and eˆ be the solution of (7). If Q>2 ∈ NSPq(k, γ) for some
0 < γ < 1 and q > 1, then
‖eˆ− e‖1 ≤
m√
2
(
4 (1 + γ)
m (1− γ)
) 1
q
‖e− e[k]‖1 , (10)
where e[k] is a best k-term approximation of e.
Proof. From the results in [32](Theorem III.4.1), the following
inequality holds:
‖eˆ− e‖q ≤
1√
2
(
4 (1 + γ)
(1− γ)
) 1
q
‖e− e[k]‖q .
The result follows by using the following well-known norm
inequality for q > 1:
‖x‖q ≤ ‖x‖1 ≤ m1−
1
q ‖x‖q .
Remark 3. This result demonstrates how the choice of q in the
parameterized nullspace property NSPq can be used to modify
the error bound. It is also worth noting that the NSPq may
be quite different for different q-s. A nice entity relationship
diagram for RIP, NSP and coherence is also given in Figure
III.2 of [32]. It would be nice to see the resulting error bounds
change with these quantities laid out on the same diagram,
although not pursued for this paper.
Remark 4. It is noteworthy that as q →∞, the upper bound
in Theorem 3 approaches the uniform bound
‖eˆ− e‖1 ≤
m√
2
‖e− e[k]‖1 . (11)
Theorem 4 (maximum correctable errors). Suppose that the
nonzero vector e ∈ Rm satisfies
‖eT ‖q < γ ‖eT c‖q , γ ∈ (0, 1), q > 1
for all T ⊂ {1, . . . ,m} satisfying |T | ≤ k. Then
k <
γq
1 + γq
m (12)
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, that |e1| ≥ . . . ≥
|em|. Then,
|T |∑
i=1
|ei|q < γq
m∑
i=|T |+1
|ei|q.
Observe that
∣∣e|T |∣∣, otherwise the right hand side of the above
inequality would be zero identically and the strict inequality
in the hypothesis could not hold. Next, dividing through by∣∣e|T |∣∣q and observing that
|ei|∣∣e|T |∣∣
 ≥ 1 if i ≤ |T |≤ 1 if i > |T | .
Thus,
|T | ≤
|T |∑
i=1
(
|ei|∣∣e|T |∣∣
)q
< γq
m∑
i=|T |+1
(
|ei|∣∣e|T |∣∣
)q
≤ γq (m− |T |) .
Rearranging the terms of |T | < γq (m− |T |) gives
|T | < γ
q
1 + γq
m,
which gives the desired result for all |T | ≤ k.
Remark 5. For a given k, the result also gives a lower bound
on admissible γ as
γ >
(
k
m− k
) 1
q
.
The next result gives numerical sufficient conditions for
Q>2 ∈ NSP1(k, 1)
Theorem 5. Given the unitary matrix Q ∈ Rm×m
Q =
[
Q1 Q2
]
,
where Q1 ∈ Rm×n and Q2 ∈ Rm×(m−n), n < m are
orthogonal complements. For any integers k < m2 and q ≥ 2,
if
‖Q1T ‖q , sup
x 6=0
‖Q1T x‖q
‖x‖q
<
1
2
k
1
q−1, (13)
for all T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with |T | ≤ k, then Q>2 ∈
NSP1(k, 1).
Proof. First, we observe that the inequality ‖e‖q ≤ ‖e‖2 ≤
‖e‖1 ≤ m1−
1
q ‖e‖q holds for all vector e ∈ Rm and integer
q ≥ 2. Thus, for all T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with |T | ≤ k and
x ∈ Rn,
‖Q1T ‖q <
1
2
k
1
q−1 ⇒ 2k1− 1q ‖Q1T x‖q < ‖x‖q
⇒ 2 |T |1− 1q ‖Q1T x‖q < ‖x‖q
⇒ 2 ‖Q1T x‖1 < ‖x‖2 = ‖Q1x‖2
⇒ 2 ‖Q1T x‖1 < ‖Q1x‖2 < ‖Q1x‖1
⇒ 2 ‖Q1T x‖1 < ‖Q1x‖1 = ‖Q1T x‖1 + ‖Q1T cx‖1
⇒ ‖Q1T x‖1 < ‖Q1T cx‖1
⇒ Q>2 ∈ NSP1(k, 1)
5Remark 6. For q = 2, the sufficient condition becomes
σ(Q1T ) <
1
2
√
k
which imposes a limit on the amount of
information any k-group of rows can convey of the orthogonal
matrix Q1. In other words, this ensures there is sufficient
redundancy such if any k combination of rows are deleted,
the resulting system can still be used to reconstruct the state.
This property is the motivation for the support refinement and
row deletion scheme in [23].
The following corollary gives a more specialized result
based on q = 1.
Corollary 2. Let v ∈ Rm be a vector whose elements
are the ∞-norm of the corresponding row of Q1 i.e, vi =
max
1≤j≤m
∣∣Q1ij∣∣. If
‖v[k]‖1 <
1
2
√
n
, (14)
then Q>2 ∈ NSP1(k, 1).
Proof. First, we make the following observations for all x ∈
Rn
• ‖Q1T x‖1 ≤
(
max
1≤j≤n
{∥∥∥Q1jT ∥∥∥
1
})
‖x‖1
≤ ‖v[k]‖1 ‖x‖1 .
• ‖Q1x‖1 ≥ ‖Q1x‖2 = ‖x‖2 ≥
1√
n
‖x‖1
⇒ 1√
n
‖x‖1 ≤ ‖Q1x‖1 .
Thus, if 2 ‖v[k]‖1 < 1√n , then
2 ‖Q1T x‖1 ≤ 2 ‖v[k]‖1 ‖x‖1 <
1√
n
‖x‖1 ≤ ‖Q1x‖1 ,
⇒ 2 ‖Q1T x‖1 < ‖Q1x‖1 = ‖Q1T x‖1 + ‖Q1T cx‖1
⇒ ‖Q1T x‖1 < ‖Q1T cx‖1
⇒ Q>2 ∈ NSP1(k, 1)
IV. RESILIENT ESTIMATION WITH PRIOR INFORMATION
Using prior information to enhance the recovery of sparse
signals in compressive sensing is not a new idea [23], [35]–
[37]. However, vast majority of the existing literature focuses
on prior information relating to the support of the sparse
signal. In this paper, we consider prior information as a
probability distribution over the system measurements. For
cyber-physical systems, which are the primary subject of this
study, such information is readily available via data-driven
auxiliary models. In the light of model (1) and the optimization
problem in (7), consider the following slightly more general
problem:
Minimize:
e
‖e‖1 Subject to: y − e ∈ V ∩ X , (15)
where V ⊂ Rm is a linear subspace satisfying the subspace
property ‖vT ‖1 ≤ γ ‖vT c‖1, ∀v ∈ V, |T | ≤ k < m,
and X ⊂ Rm is a convex set with the bounded property
‖x‖1 ≤ δ, ∀x ∈ X . The bounded set adds extra layer of
prior information which, as we will show next, improves
the reconstruction error bound. While we have used a very
simple bound here, other relevant property may be used to
encode specialized prior information which can then lead to
specialized result for the particular application. For instance;
the bound could be probabilistic – determined from the
ROC characteristic of a data-driven, encode domain-specific
relationship among the measurement channels.
We now have all the ingredients to state our main results:
Theorem 6. Consider the recovery optimization problem in
(15), where the linear subspace V satisfies the subspace
property ‖vT ‖1 ≤ γ ‖vT c‖1, ∀v ∈ V, |T | ≤ k < m, and the
convex set X ⊂ Rm satisfies the bounded property ‖x‖1 ≤ δ,
∀x ∈ X . The reconstruction error with respect to any feasible
vector e ∈ Rm is bounded as:
‖eˆ− e‖1 ≤ 2satδ
(
1 + γ
1− γ ‖e− e[k]‖1
)
, (16)
where e[k] is the best k-term approximation of e.
Remark 7. This result is similar to existing recovery error-
bound in literature [32]. The main difference lie in the satu-
ration given by the bound on the prior-information set. This
bound show up explicitly because of the way it was defined in
the set. In some practical situation, such explicit bound may
not exist. It is easy to modify the result based on the new
characteristic of the prior-information set. In situations where
the actual vector is only known to belong to the set X with
some probability, the inclusion constraint may be reformulated
into a chance constraint with the final result inheriting the
associated probabilistic guarantees.
Remark 8. Indeed, any k-sparse feasible vector e ∈ Rm,
|supp(e)| ≤ k < m will be recovered exactly by the solution
to the optimization problem in (15). Although the question
of the stability of the recovery process to process noise is
not pursued in this paper, we expect similar saturated error
bound results as obtained above. We will demonstrate the
stability numerically by including noise in the example given
in subsequent sections.
Proof. Let e be a feasible point of the optimization problem
in (15), and eˆ , e + h, h ∈ Rn be the optimal point. Given
k < m, define the index set T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with |T | ≤ k.
By the optimality of eˆ, we have that ‖e‖1 ≥ ‖eˆ‖1, which
implies that:
‖e‖1 ≥ ‖eˆ‖1 = ‖e+ h‖1
= ‖eT + hT ‖1 + ‖eT c + hT c‖1
≥ ‖eT ‖1 − ‖hT ‖1 + ‖hT c‖1 − ‖eT c‖1
=⇒ ‖hT c‖1 ≤ ‖hT ‖1 + ‖e‖1 − ‖eT ‖1 + ‖eT c‖1
= ‖hT ‖1 + 2 ‖eT c‖1 .
Thus
‖hT c‖1 ≤ ‖hT ‖1 + 2 ‖eT c‖1 . (17)
6Next, since e and eˆ are feasible, i.e., e, eˆ ∈ X ⇒ ‖e− y‖1 ≤
δ and ‖eˆ− y‖1 = ‖h+ e− y‖1 ≤ δ, it follows that
‖h‖1 = ‖hT ‖1 + ‖hT c‖1 ≤ 2δ. (18)
Moreover, from the feasibility of e and eˆ, e−y, eˆ−y ∈ V ⇒
h = eˆ− e ∈ V . Thus, from the subspace property, it follows
that
‖hT ‖1 ≤ γ ‖hT c‖1 , for some 0 < γ < 1. (19)
Adding the inequalities in (17) and (19) gives
‖h‖1 ≤ (1− γ) ‖hT ‖1 + γ ‖hT ‖1 + 2 ‖eT c‖1 + γ ‖hT c‖1
≤ (1− γ) ‖hT ‖1 + γ ‖h‖1 + 2 ‖eT c‖1 .
Subtracting γ ‖h‖1 from both sides and dividing by 1−γ gives
‖h‖1 ≤ ‖hT ‖1 +
2
1− γ ‖eT c‖1 ,
so that
‖hT c‖1 ≤
2
1− γ ‖eT c‖1 . (20)
Combining (19) and (20) yields
‖hT ‖1 ≤ γ ‖hT c‖1 ≤
2γ
1− γ ‖eT c‖1 . (21)
By, adding the inequalities in (20) and (21), it follows that
‖h‖1 = ‖hT ‖1 + ‖hT c‖ ≤
2 (1 + γ)
1− γ ‖eT c‖1 , (22)
which, after combining with (18), yields
‖h‖1 ≤ min
{
2 (1 + γ)
1− γ ‖eT c‖1 , 2δ
}
≤ 2 min
{
(1 + γ)
1− γ ‖eT c‖1 , δ
}
.
Thus, the inequality
‖h‖1 ≤ 2satδ
(
(1 + γ)
1− γ ‖eT c‖1
)
holds for all index set T ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,m} with |T | ≤ k. The
result follows by selecting T = supp(e).
Now, we focus on the development of a resilient recon-
struction algorithm using both measurement model and a prior
information model. Consider a concurrent model of the form:
y = Hx+ e+ ε (23)
y ∼ N (µ(z),Σ(z)) (24)
ε ∼ N (0,diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2m)) (25)
where H ∈ Rm×n is the measurement matrix, x ∈ Rn is
the state vector, e ∈ Rm, ‖e‖0 ≤ k < m is the attack
vector, and ε ∈ Rm is the measurement noise. The concurrent
model consists of a measurement model (23), prior information
(auxiliary) model (24) given as a function of the auxiliary
variable z ∈ Rp, and a noise model (25), where
µ(z) =
 µ1(z)...
µm(z)
 and Σ(z) =
 Σ1(z) . . .
Σm(z)

for some mean and covariance functions µi : Rp 7→ R
and Σi : Rp 7→ R+ respectively (see Section V-B for a
particular example using GPR). For a Cyber-physical system,
the measurement model is usually physics-based while the
prior-information is data-driven. The noise model is generally
knowledge-based. One of the main advantages of using models
of this form for a CPS is that the resulting blend of the
generalization properties of physics-based models and the
adaptive local accuracy of data-driven methods creates an
additional layer of redundancy which can reveal the truth
even if portions of the measurement is subject to adversarial
corruption. In order to remain undetectable, any viable attack
vector ya, ‖ya‖`0 = p ≤ m necessarily have to satisfy the
condition p(y + ya|z,D) ≥ p(y|z,D). This provides an
additional layer of security by: 1) requiring the attacker to
have knowledge of the auxiliary model and the parameters,
and 2) limiting the magnitude of possible state corruption.
Let y∗ be the true value of the measured variable, the op-
timal estimation problem is cast as the optimization problem:
Minimize: ‖y −Hx− ε‖l0
Subject to:
Hx ∈ Y(z)
ε ∈ E ,
(26)
where the convex sets Y(z) and E have the property that:
p(y∗ ∈ Y|z,D) ≥ τ (27)
p(ε∗ ∈ E) ≥ τ. (28)
The idea is essentially seeking a state vector, together with the
minimum attacked channels and a highly likely noise vector,
which completely explains the observations while having a
high likelihood according to the auxiliary model prior. Ideally,
one would use an index minimizing “0-norm” in the objective,
as done above. However, Theorem 6 shows that the 1-norm
relaxation achieves a really good reconstruction property, pro-
vided that the range space of H satisfies the subspace property.
The optimization parameter τ ∈ (0, 1] controls the likelihood
threshold. It can be set to a constant value or optimized with
respect to some higher-level objectives. Thus, the resilient state
estimation optimization problem is equivalent to:
Minimize: ‖y −Hx− ε‖1
Subject to:
‖Hx+ ε− µ(z)‖2Σ−1(z) ≤ χ2m(τ)
‖ε‖2Σ−1ε ≤ χ2m(τ),
(29)
where Σε = diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2m) and χ2m(τ) is the quantile
function for probability τ of the chi-squared distribution with
m degrees of freedom.
The following lemma will be useful in proving the next
result about the reconstruction error bound of the resulting
resilient estimation based on the optimization problem in (29).
7Lemma 1. Given a vector ε ∈ Rm with ‖ε‖2 ≤ δ, then the
following kth term approximation error bound
‖ε− ε[k]‖1 ≤
m− k√
m
δ (30)
holds for k < m.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose the elements of ε
are ordered as |ε1| ≤ |ε2| ≤ . . . ≤ |εm|, then
‖ε− ε[k]‖1 =
m−k∑
i=1
|εi|
≤
m∑
i=1
|εi| − k |εk| = ‖ε‖1 − k |εk|
≤ ‖ε‖1 −
k
m− k (m− k) |εk|
≤ ‖ε‖1 −
k
m− k
m−k∑
i=1
|εi|
≤ ‖ε‖1 −
k
m− k ‖ε− ε[k]‖1
From which
‖ε− ε[k]‖1 ≤
m− k
m
‖ε‖1 ≤
m− k√
m
‖ε‖2 ≤
m− k√
m
δ
Theorem 7. Consider the recovery optimization problem in
(29). Suppose the unknown true state x∗ ∈ Rn is a feasi-
ble of the optimization problem. If the range space R(H)
of H satisfies the subspace property ‖vT ‖1 ≤ γ ‖vT c‖1,
∀v ∈ R(H), |T | ≤ k < m, then the reconstruction error
can be upper bounded as:
‖xˆ− x∗‖2 ≤ C1satδ(τ) (C2 ‖eˆ− eˆ[k]‖1 + C3δ(τ))
+ C1satδ(τ) (C3δ(τ)) , (31)
where eˆ = y −Hxˆ− εˆ is the objective residual,
δ(τ) = Σ
1
2χm(τ), C1 =
2
σH
, C2 =
1 + γ
1− γ ,
C3 =
(1 + γ)
(1− γ)
(m− k)√
m
σ,
σH is the smallest singular value of H , and σ and Σ are
the biggest standard deviations of the auxiliary model and
measurement noise statistics respectively.
Proof. Define the sets X ,Xε ⊂ Rm as
X (z) ,
{
y ∈ Rm : ‖y − µ(z)‖2Σ−1(z) ≤ χ2m(τ)
}
Xε ,
{
ε ∈ Rm : ‖ε‖2Σ−1ε ≤ χ2m(τ)
}
.
Thus, the optimization problem in (29) can be expressed as:
Minimize: ‖e‖1
Subject to:
y − e− ε ∈ R(H)
y − e ∈ X (z)
ε ∈ Xε.
(P )
Also, consider the reduced problem
Minimize: ‖e‖1
Subject to:
y − e ∈ R(H) ∩ X .
(Pˆ )
Let
• e∗ ∈ Rm, ‖e∗‖0 = k and ε∗ ∈ Rm be the unknown
actual attack vector and noise instance respectively,
• eˆ, εˆ ∈ Rm be the minimal points of the optimization
problem in (P ), and
• eˆ2 ∈ Rm be the solution of the reduced problem in (Pˆ ).
Using the result in Theorem 6, the observation that e∗ + ε∗
and eˆ+ εˆ are feasible points of (Pˆ ) and Lemma 1, yield:
‖eˆ2 − e∗ − ε∗‖1 ≤ 2satδ
(
1 + γ
1− γ ‖ε
∗ − ε[k]∗‖1
)
≤ 2satδ
(
(1 + γ)(m− k)Σ¯
(1− γ)√m δ
)
,
with δ = Σ
1
2χm(τ). Using the left-hand-side triangular
inequality, the above inequality implies that:
‖eˆ+ εˆ− e∗ − ε∗‖1 ≤ ‖eˆ2 − e∗ − ε∗‖1 + ‖eˆ2 − eˆ− εˆ‖1
≤ 2satδ
(
(1 + γ)(m− k)Σ¯
(1− γ)√m δ
)
+ 2satδ
(
1 + γ
1− γ ‖eˆ− eˆ[k] + εˆ− εˆ[k]‖1
)
≤ 2satδ
(
(1 + γ)(m− k)Σ¯
(1− γ)√m δ
)
+ 2satδ
(
1 + γ
1− γ ‖eˆ− eˆ[k]‖1 +
(1 + γ)(m− k)Σ¯
(1− γ)√m δ
)
.
Expressing the right-hand-side of the last inequality in the
“language” of the original problem in (29) yields
‖H(xˆ− x∗)‖1 ≤ 2satδ
(
(1 + γ)(m− k)Σ¯
(1− γ)√m δ
)
+ 2satδ
(
1 + γ
1− γ ‖eˆ− eˆ[k]‖1 +
(1 + γ)(m− k)Σ¯
(1− γ)√m δ
)
,
where xˆ− x∗ is the resulting state estimation error, which is
consequently bounded as:
‖xˆ− x∗‖2 ≤ C1satδ (C2 ‖eˆ− eˆ[k]‖1 + C3δ) + C1satδ (C3δ)
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE: POWER SYSTEM STATE
ESTIMATION WITH DATA-DRIVEN ECONOMIC AUXILIARY
MODEL
In this numerical simulation example, a resilient state esti-
mation algorithm based on the optimization problem in (29) is
developed and evaluated on the IEEE 14-bus test case mapped
to actual data from the the New York Independent System
Operator (NYISO). For this application, the prior information
is obtained from a GPR mapping from some energy market
information to an iid Gaussian distributions on the system
measurements. This example first appeared in our earlier work
[24]. Interested readers are directed to that paper for more
details. In what follows, we only provide an overview to
strengthen the theoretical results of the previous sections.
8A. Setup
The IEEE 14-bus system, shown in Fig. 1a, represents a
simple approximation of the American electric power system
as of February 1962. It has 14 buses, 5 generators, and 11
loads. The system has 27 state variables which are the voltage
angles and voltage magnitudes of the buses, with the first bus
angle chosen as the reference one. The buses/nodes of the
power grid model are assumed to be supported with IIoT mea-
surement sensors such as remote terminal units (RTUs) able to
provide bus-related measurements of active and reactive power
injection and flow.
Simulation experiments are performed using the actual
load data of New York state as provided by NYISO [38].
Specifically, five-minute load data of NYISO for 3 months
(between January and March) in 2017 and 2018 are used.
Furthermore, each region of the NYISO map, shown in
Fig. 1b, is mapped in an ascending order with every load
bus of IEEE 14 system, i.e. using the following mapping:
[2 → 1, 3 → 2, 4 → 3, 5 → 4, 6 → 5, 9 → 6, 10 →
7, 11 → 8, 12 → 9, 13 → 10, 14 → 11], where the first
element show the load bus of IEEE 14 case the second the
region of NYISO, e.g., bus 2 to region A-WEST, bus 3 to
region B-GENESE, bus 4 to region C-CENTRL, etc. By this,
we were able to create realistic attack data to validate the
earlier theoretical claims.
B. Auxiliary model
From the collected NYSIO historical load and market data,
we built a Gaussian Process Regression (GPR) model which
maps from locational bus marginal prices to bus voltages
and angle measurements. This, as shown in previous sections,
provides an added layer of redundancy for boosting system
resiliency to arbitrary data corruption. A Gaussian Process
(GP) is a collection (possibly infinite) of continuous random
variables G, any finite subset of which are jointly Gaussian.
GPR uses GPs to encode prior distributions over functions1.
The priors are then updated to form posterior distributions
when new data is collected. For a comprehensive introduction
to GP and GPR, and their applications for learning and control,
the readers are directed to [39] and a recent survey in [40].
Consider a dataset D = {Z,Y}, where Z ∈ Rp×N is a
matrix containing the values of the auxiliary variables column-
wise, Y ∈ Rm×N are the corresponding sensor measurement
values and N is the number of datapoint in the dataset. The
goal is to learn an implicit mapping f : Rp 7→ Rm for which
yi = f(zi) + ε, i = 1, . . . N, (32)
where ε ∼ N (0,diag(σ21 , . . . , σ2m)). In theory, without any
further restriction, the problem is ill-defined because there
are potentially many possible functions that explains the data
exactly notwithstanding the measurement noise. As a means
of regularization, the class of functions for consideration is
refined by the restriction f(z) ∼ GP(m(z), k(z, z′)) to a GP
completely specified by its mean and covariance functions2
1In this case will be functions from auxiliary measurements to observed
measurements.
2Also known as kernels.
(a) IEEE 14-bus system.
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Fig. 1: IEEE 14-bus system mapped into NYISO control area
load zones data.
µ(z) , E[f(z)] (33)
k(z, z′) , E[(f(z)− µ(z))(f(z′)− µ(z′))]. (34)
The covariance function can then be specified apriori without
an explicit probability distribution. This is where the prior
(possibly knowledge-based) information is encoded in the GP.
While any positive definite function may pass for a covariance
function, one commonly used is the squared exponential
covariance function:
k(z, z′) = A exp
(
− 1
2l
‖z− z′‖22
)
, (35)
where hyperparameters A and l implicitly define a
smoothness-promoting prior. Given a query point z ∈ Rp for
the auxiliary variable, the posterior distribution for the jth
sensor values is p(yj |z,D) = N (µj(z),Σj(z)), with the mean
and covariance function given by
9µj(z) = k(z)
> (K + σ2j I)−1Y>j , (36)
Σj(z) = k(z, z)− k(z)>
(
K + σ2j I
)−1
k(z), j = 1, . . . ,m
(37)
where K ∈ RN×N is a covariance matrix with entries Kij =
k(zi, zj) and k(z) ∈ RN is a vector with entries k(z)i =
k(z, zi).
The overall sensor values posterior distribution is given by:
p(y|z,D) =
m∏
j=1
N (µj(z),Σj(z)) (38)
= N (µ(z),Σ(z)), (39)
where
µ(z) =
 µ1(z)...
µm(z)
 and Σ(z) =
 Σ1(z) . . .
Σm(z)

C. Solution Algorithm
In addition to the nice reconstruction property of the 1-norm
relaxation, Iteratively re-weighted algorithms [41], [42] have
been demonstrated to be a highly effective way of approxi-
mating the solution of the nonconvex problem with successive
convex problems. In particular, for the solution of the problem
in (26), the re-weighted 1-norm minimization scheme of [41]
is employed to give even stronger reconstruction algorithm.
Consider the operator P : Rm × Rp × Rm×m 7→ Rn+m,
where
xˆ(W ), εˆ(W ) = P(y, z,W ) (40)
are given by the minimizers of the convex program:
Minimize: ‖W (y −Hx− ε)‖1
Subject to:
‖Hx+ ε− µ(z)‖2Σ−1(z) ≤ χ2nc(τ)
‖ε‖2Σ−1ε ≤ χ2m(τ),
(41)
Using this, the algorithm for the enhance state estimator is
outlined in Algorithm 1.
D. Results
The enhanced resilient estimation algorithm in Algorithm 1
was implemented and ran for data collected every five minutes
in a simulation environment. The process begins with the
auxiliary measurements z =
[
zlbmp zmcl zmcc
]
, which
are actual data downloaded from the respective nodes of the
NYISO transmission grid. Here, zlbmp is the locational
bus marginal prices ($/MWh), zmcl is the marginal
cost loses ($/MWh) and zmcc is the marginal cost
congestion ($/MWh). Next, the trained GPR model is
executed to give the mean µ(z) and the covariance Σ(z) of
Algorithm 1 Resilient Optimal State Estimation Algorithm
Using Re-weighted 1-norm minimization
procedure OFFLINE
D ← {Z,Y} . Dataset sparsification
K ← k(Z,Z) . Kernel matrix
Σε, A, l← . Hyperparameters initialization,
procedure COLLECT DATA
y← . Sensor measurements at the current instant
z← . Auxiliary measurements at the current instant
procedure UPDATE MODELS
H ← . Model-based. See Sub-section V-A for details
for j = 1 to m do . Data-driven posterior
µj ← k(z)>
(
K + σ2j I
)−1
Y>j , . Mean
Σj ← k(z, z)− k(z)>
(
K + σ2j I
)−1
k(z), .
Covariance
procedure RE-WEIGHTED 1-NORM MINIMIZATION(y,z)
W , diag[w1, . . . , wm]← I
l← 0 . Iteration count
while not converged and l ≤ lmax do
xˆl, εˆl ← P(y, z,W ) . `1 minimization
r← y −Hxˆl − εˆl . residual
for j = 1 to m do . weights update
wj ← 1|rj |+δ
l← l + 1 . increment counter
return xˆl, εˆl . State estimate is xˆl
Fig. 2: Simulation results for targeted sensor measurements.
Attack vectors are generated to bias select measurements
locations by 500% of its true value along a randomly chosen
direction. Plots is the percentage of successful estimations vs.
the percentage of attacked sensor nodes.
the data-driven auxiliary model. Two kinds of FDIA generation
were used in the simulation. For the first kind, attack vectors
are generated to bias selected measurements locations by
500% of its true value along a randomly chosen direction.
For the second kind, the attack vectors ya are systematically
generated to result in a specified bias in the state estimation
at targeted state variables.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the performance of the proposed
10
Fig. 3: Simulation results for targeted state FDIA.
Attack vectors are generated to bias particular state variables
by 50%. Plotted are the distribution of the rms values of rel-
ative errors for targeted states and maximum absolute relative
error over all state variables. Subplots: (a) 1 targeted state
variable, (b) 5 targeted state variables (c) 10 targeted state
variables, (d) 20 targeted state variables.
algorithm, compared with other standard methods in literature,
to the two kinds of FDIA described above.
For the first set of results, three different state estimation
algorithms are simulated against a FDIA directed at specific
measurement locations. The three algorithms are: 1) standard
least squares (xˆ = arg min ‖y −Hx‖22), 2) re-weighted `1
without the auxiliary model constraint and 3) the proposed re-
weighted `1 with auxiliary model constraint. There are 109
load flow measurements in the simulation. Each simulated
scenario, circle points in Fig. 2, examines 200 simulations
(per state estimation method) with random combinations of
sensor locations having fixed percentage (x-axis values) of
sensor nodes under attack.
For the second set of results, the attacks were created in
the range space of the system Jacobian matrices. It is well
known (e.g., [4]) that both unconstrained methods will behave
similarly under this class of attacks. Thus, we restrict our
comparison only to the re-weighted `1 algorithms – one with
auxiliary constraints and the other without. Fig. 3 shows the
simulations results for four different cases with different num-
bers of targeted state variables. Fig. 3 shows two plots for each
case side-by-side – one with auxiliary constraints and the other
without. Each plot contains the distributions of the maximum
absolute relative error, as well as the root-mean-square (rms)
values of the relative error for the targeted states. As can
be seen from the figures, re-weighted `1 algorithms without
auxiliary constraints, even though significantly outperforms
least-squares based methods in general, are not resilient against
state-targeted FDIA.
The proposed re-weighted `1 with auxiliary constraints
shows significant improvement for both performance indica-
tors. Noticeable effects of the state-targeted FDIA begin to
appear when 10 or more states are targeted. This requires
compromising more or less 85% of the system measurement,
a feat that demands tremendous amount of resources from any
malicious actor.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we showed that incorporation of prior mea-
surement information can significantly improve the resiliency
of optimal state estimation algorithms. In particular, we proved
that certain prior set inclusion constraints results in much
stronger reconstruction error bound. The problem is for-
mulated as a constrained compressive sensing problem and
standard results were extended to prove the main results. In
addition, numerical simulations were used to validate the the-
oretical claims by developing a re-weighted `1 minimization-
base resilient state estimation algorithm for power systems in
which data acquired from various IIOT sensors and devices
are poisoned with false data injection attacks. The particular
case tested is the IEEE 14-bus system mapped to actual
NYISO load data. Thus, by corroborating the state estimation
with prior auxiliary model, we have demonstrated that it is
possible to make it much more difficult to attack a CPS just
by corrupting portion of its sensor measurements.
Our future work will aim to extend the theoretical and
algorithmic developments in this paper to:
• incorporate additional auxiliary information in the es-
timation, as well as evaluate the developed algorithms
through digital real-time simulation platforms using both
simulated and field data
• the dynamic case using multiple event-triggered auxiliary
models
• apply the results to the distributed resilient state estima-
tors and moving horizon estimators.
• the nonlinear case via infinite-dimensional compressive
sensing in Banach space.
Moreover, there are interesting theoretical questions that re-
main open; For instance, what is the resulting stability assess-
ments and margins of the resulting closed loop system when
the resilient estimator is used as a dynamic filter, whereby
the estimated states are fed into the underlying controller(s)?.
An answer to these questions, and likes, will help us judge
the quality of an auxiliary model required to achieve a given
success rate. Finally, we aim to apply this approach to more
examples of CPSs.
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